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POVERTY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: 
TOWARDS A ‘LIFE-FIRST’ UNDERSTANDING?
by Hartley Dean
In this Poverty Brief Hartley Dean1 draws on his recent 
book, Social Rights and Human Welfare, in order to:
• Critically consider the relevance of the concept of 
social inclusion to the struggle against poverty.
• Address competing interpretations of social 
inclusion, while proposing an alternative 
approach based on a ‘life-first’ understanding, 
which prioritises the inclusive realisation 
of social rights as shared means by 
which human needs are articulated.
• Suggest that such an approach might potentially 
speak to actors in a variety of contexts and 
from across the ideological spectrum.
P ove r t y  B r ie f
Introduction 
Insofar as social exclusion is a concept and a process 
associated, if not synonymous, with poverty, we might 
assume that social inclusion is a ‘good thing’ and, 
potentially, an antidote to poverty. Like social exclusion, 
however, the concept of social inclusion is as protean as 
it is popular. It can mean many things. There are on the 
one hand communitarian understandings of the term that 
regard social inclusion in terms of social belonging; of 
having and accepting one’s natural or proper place within 
a hierarchical social order. Such understandings may be 
seen as an apologia for, or a defence of, what critics regard 
as, potentially, a form of ‘adverse incorporation’2. On the 
other hand there are liberal understandings that identity 
social inclusion with a particular definition of freedom; 
with having and accepting effective opportunities to 
participate in a notionally fair, open but potentially risky 
society3. The difference between these two extremes is 
rooted in contrasting attitudes to social security and 
personal autonomy: the communitarian understanding 
prizes the former over the latter; the liberal understanding, 
vice versa. We may agree that social inclusion is a ‘good 
thing’ for human beings, but disagree about the extent 
to which both social security and personal autonomy are 
necessary to living a ‘good life’4, or whether indeed the 
two are to some extent inimical.
Drawing on a concept tentatively explored in a 
recent book5, I wish to suggest an alternative ‘life- first’ 
understanding of social inclusion. The term may be used to 
capture a conception of human welfare or wellbeing, and 
of social rights as a requirement of a good life; of a life lived 
in pursuit not of mere survival or even happiness, but of 
human fulfilment; of an ethical life during which we seek 
mutual recognition not only through love and solidarity, 
but also through rights; through the claims we make upon 
one another and can agree to as members of humanity6. A 
life-first understanding requires an acceptance of collective 
responsibility for the attainment of good lives, including 
lives led by distant strangers7. But it also entails a conception 
of social rights that are truly social, fluid and negotiable8; 
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the feminist ethic of care15; an ethic which, once again, 
puts care centre stage, emphasising the extent to which 
human wellbeing depends on the social negotiation of 
responsibilities and relationships. The point about a life-first 
understanding is that it construes the human individual’s 
need for autonomy not in terms of self-sufficiency, but in the 
context of social interdependency; it prioritises the integrity 
of the human being as a living social actor, rather than as 
a competitive utility maximising individual and agent of 
economic production. 
Whether in the context of conventional ideological 
discourse or more radical interpretations of human need, a 
life-first understanding provides a foundation for a politics 
of social inclusion that resolves the tension between 
social security and personal autonomy, by prioritising 
the articulation of complex, variable and evolving human 
needs through inclusive negotiations of social rights: 
negotiations that must necessarily occur in a multiplicity 
of ways and at a multiplicity of levels, ranging from local 
dialogue to global treaty-making. A shared life-first 
understanding of social inclusion offers, perhaps, the 
holistic basis for a concerted struggle against poverty.
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that are universal in reach, not form. Social rights provide 
the shared means by which we articulate human needs.
This is an idea that can be inflected in a variety of 
different ways. Within the realms of conventional political 
discourse a life-first understanding challenges narrow 
utilitarian thinking, since it recognises that life’s meaning 
precedes the things that people might choose, or be made, 
to do. From within the spectrum of liberal thinking, social 
liberals as ‘reluctant collectivists’9 are likely - implicitly 
or explicitly - to subscribe to some brand of Kantian 
deontological ethics that can accommodate elements of 
collective responsibility and which may be attracted for 
example, either to a Rawlsian conception of social justice, 
or perhaps to Sen’s capability approach. Similarly, radical 
democrats and left-communitarians10, might rally in 
various ways around a life-first approach that emphasises 
the significance of life-guarantees through risk sharing 
and social insurance. There is scope for discussion of a 
life-first understanding within contemporary liberal and 
communitarian discourses. 
The life-first understanding resonates most strongly with 
a Marxian theory of human need. Marx defined human 
needs in relation to human beings’ species characteristics: 
the things that define what it is to be human. And he 
espoused a concept of ‘radical’ needs11, by which he was 
alluding to the ultimate potential of humanity. His vision 
was of a society that might succeed from capitalism; a 
society in which the measure of things would flow from 
inclusive understandings of need (premised on fully human 
lives), rather than from fetishised conceptions of value 
(premised on the commodity form). There is no immediate 
prospect of capitalism’s overthrow, but we can envisage 
how a life-first emphasis upon the development of social 
rights and democratic social planning might constitute 
the beginnings of what Soper12 has alluded to as a politics 
of human need. Essentially the same insight is captured 
by de Sousa Santos’ conceptualisation of an ‘axiology of 
care’13: a theory that values care, not economic progress or 
commodities. De Sousa Santos suggests that as a means to 
challenge the orthodoxies of global capitalism we might 
explore alternative ways of thinking that emanate from 
the global South. Similarly, the ideas of Illich or Friere14, 
radically challenged the professionalised premises on which 
human service provision imported by the global South 
from the global North are founded, arguing instead for 
rights to health and educational provision to be premised 
on ‘conviviality’ and shared consciousness raising. There 
is also an important connection that can be made with 
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